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Abstract: For an accurate study of the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War, it is 
important to analyze military health care. The reshuffle of the Military Me-
dical Corps during the Republic reduced its staff and reinforced it. Medical 
Corps officers were divided after the military uprising of 1936. Rebels kept 
organic continuity, completely centralized around the Main Headquarters 
and the Board of Services. Healthcare network was rebuilt from military di-
visions and invested with an attractive mobile structure. Medical troops 
were increased by urgent measures. The appointment of civil doctors and 
pharmacists was the most effective and lasting one. New military doctors 
would obtain good jobs in the first post war period. 
 
Keywords: Spanish Army, Military Medical Corps, Spanish Civil War, Mi-
litary hospitals. 
 
Resumen: Para estudiar la Guerra Civil española de 1936-1939 resulta cru-
cial evaluar la asistencia sanitaria militar. La remodelación del Cuerpo de 
Sanidad militar durante la República redujo los efectivos y ganó en firmeza. 
Al producirse la sublevación militar de 1936 los mandos de Sanidad Militar 
se dividieron. En línea de continuidad orgánica los sublevados centralizaron 
por completo este Cuerpo entorno a la Jefatura de Servicios y la Junta Fa-
cultativa e implementaron urgentes medidas para conseguir efectivos. La 
asimilación de médicos y farmacéuticos civiles será la más efectiva y de 
mayor alcance. La red asistencial se construyó en base divisionaria y con 
una atrayente estructura móvil. En la inmediata posguerra la útil colocación 
situó a los asimilados. 
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he development of an efficient military health program is a determining factor in any 
campaign or war. Military manuals defined health services as “the conservation of hu-
man resources”. In this sense, one of the lessons drawn from World War I was the im-
portance of a well-maintained and innovative system of military medicine. In the inter-
war period, a strong drive was made to perfect procedures and strengthen the organiza-
tion of military health services. Improvements included advances in surgery, surgical 
ambulances, nursing units, vaccines, the use of antiseptics to prevent gangrene, the crea-
tion of front line hospitals, the replenishment of equipment and medicines, evacuation 
systems and, equally important, psychological assistance. These were essential elements 
in any armed conflict. And in the case of a ruthless civil war in which the civilian popu-
lation became hostage to the fighters, the needs were even greater. Therefore, when ana-
lyzing the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, establishing the role of military health care 
is fundamental. 
 By the early 1930s, in contrast to the modern armies of Europe, the Spanish Ar-
my had incorporated no distinctive equipment, strategies or tactics. Its ordnance was in 
such a ruinous state that often it was inoperative. The “art of war” was anything but 
innovative. Military training looked to the past. For over a century, organization of the 
Spanish Military Health Corps had been addressed only in the midst of colonial cam-
paigns and was devoid of realistic budgets, lacking in planning and inferior to civilian 
health care. Reviews of the history of Spanish military medicine have revealed this sor-
ry state of neglect.
 2
 It must even be said that reports were falsified to conceal its brutal 
failures. Among the population, the Corps medic came to mind only for his questionable 
role in authorizing exemptions from the obligatory military service. 
 The popular view of military health care was formed during the blood-drenched 
Moroccan campaigns, and was to persist. Faced with inadequate equipment and lacking 
the necessary medicines, the valor and skill of surgeons and practitioners was the only 
training available in the North African battlefields. "Army medicine and, more particu-
larly, surgery was dominated, between the end of the Great War and the outbreak of the 
Civil War, by the continuing struggle agains Maroccan insurgents... The army medical 
branch was highly respected, and its surgeons gained valuable experience in the Maroc-
co campaings".
3
 But any military leader could see the need for more surgeons and for an 
overhaul of the service. Following the terrible disaster of 1921, medical Colonel Silvano 
Escribano, a hygienist, had denounced that military health care in the Riff War was cha-
otic and raised the death toll. The general reforms undertaken by the Second Republic 
corrected some calamities. Ranks were established for medical practitioners and techni-
cians, with viable budgets. But these military doctors were tied to the powerful physi-
cians who controlled the country's health apparatus with an iron hand. In fact, due to the 
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constant lack of personnel and their meager salaries, the Military Health Corps had nev-
er emerged from under their wing. 
 With the military uprising of July 1936, management of military medicine be-
came different on the two sides. Here, we are dealing with the rebel faction, in which 
the scarcity of competent and specialized personnel soon became evident. Enlistment 
mechanisms used throughout the war failed to contemplate the skills of the conscripts, 
only replacement numbers.
 4
  Incorporations from the Carlist ranks, the Falange or the 
Red Cross were equally insufficient. A different matter was the control of hospitals by 
religious congregations. Furthermore, as the rebels were unrepresented in international 
organizations, help from these quarters was scarce. The victors' historiography has ex-
plained the service, but their account is incorrect. In reality, military doctors failed to 
control the medical service and were incapable of assuring continuous care. Therefore, 
the role of civilian doctors was key. 
 The incorporation of civilian physicians and pharmacists made up for the scant 
military staff. As a result, the civilian population in Nationalist Spain suffered partial 
neglect. Rebel leaders demanded all categories of medical personnel, specially sur-
geons. It was hardly an easy task to organize a health service that covered the whole 
front line and handled the evacuation to rearguard hospitals. The establishment of a 
network of medical centers proved to be key to winning the war, as much for technical 
reasons as for troop morale. Civilian doctors, already purged, ran the set-up under light 
military supervision. As in the case of other cliques, the thick web of interests of physi-
cians within the state apparatus prevailed. After the war, those who controlled civilian 
medicine returned advantageously to the center of power, made use of clientelism and 
viciously purged whoever had remained faithful to the Republic. In general, the Civil 
War represented a total halt to the modernizations undertaken by the Republic and cre-
ated a breach of such colossal dimensions that it could no longer be closed. 
 
1. Military Health Corps troops before the uprising. 
 
After the announcement of the military reform by Azaña, on 25
th
 April 1931, there was 
a significant reduction in the number of troops in the Spanish army. Although some 
officers, much of them still feeling pessimistic after colonial losses, withdrew to avoid 
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic, in fact the majority did so to obtain the 
attractive extraordinary retirement facilitated by the reform. The Military Medical 
Corps reduced by the same proportion, thereby putting an end to the unprecedented ac-
cumulation of officers. It has been stressed that it is virtually impossible to ascertain the 
number of military members who had asked for early retirement, but this affirmation 
should be clarified. Alpert, with some difficulties, quantified the reduction for the ma-
jority of the forces: ‘Of a total in 1931 of 20,576 commanding officers and officers, 
including those from the paid reserve forces, but not the disability corps, the 1932 forc-
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 James MATTHEWS: Reluctant Warriors. Republican Popular Army and Nationalist Army in the Spa-
nish Civil War, 1936-1939, Oxford, Oxford UP, 2012, pp. 37-42, data in Table 2 (p. 38). Michael AL-
PERT: “Soldiers, Politics and War”, in Paul PRESTON (ed.), Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939, 
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es dropped to 12,373, with the active and reserve ones merged The difference was, 
therefore, 8,203 commanding officers and officers’. Puell, following the staff registers, 
raises the figure to 8,328.
5
 With Diego Durán Hidalgo and José María Gil Robles in the 
Ministry of War the number of commanders increased, especially members of the 
Unión Militar Española (UME, Spanish Military Union, an association where civilians 




 In order to modernize the outdated army, Azaña's reforms had tackled its territo-
rial structure, services and organizations, with a sideways glance at the French model. 
With the removal of military districts (the Capitanías) on 16
th
 June 1931, the military 
division was rationally composed of eight organic divisions,
7
 maintaining the two insu-
lar commands (Balearic and Canary Islands) and the Exempt Command of Asturias 
with the permanent support of a mixed mountain brigade. In the Ministry of War, the 
general management of the Military Medical Service was the responsibility of a medical 
inspector, like the division groups of the commands of Madrid and Barcelona. The 
Medical Board of the Military Medical Service, a consultancy organisation with a first-
rate medical inspector and a colonel in charge of secretary, remained in Madrid. In the 
organic divisions, the Medical Group had its own structure —not independent— to 
which services in brigades, regiments and squadrons were added. A commanding of-
ficer was in charge of helping garrison generals.  
The medical staff of the army schools were under the control of a commanding of-
ficer. A unique case was that of the Superior School of War, served by three command-
ing officers. The main park of the Military Medical Service had one colonel, two lieu-
tenant colonels, nine commanding officers and four captains. Each Regiment had one 
captain and one lieutenant, but, in those of tanks or transmissions there were two cap-
tains, and in mountain battalions there was one captain. The army posted in Morocco 
did not have its own medical group, and consequently it was divided between hospital 
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Table 1.  Commanding officers in the Military Health Care Corps, 1931-1936 
 
 1931 1932 1932/1931 
(*) 
1934 1936 1936 1931-1936 





General 3 - -3 -100.0 - - - - 100.0 
Brigadier 6 - -6 -100.0 3 4 4 -2 33.3 
          
Colonel 21 11 -10 -47.6 8 15 15 -6 28.6 
Lt.-Colonel 80 30 -50 -62.5 31 38 38 -42 52.5 
Major 233 141 -92 -39.5 161 180 180 -53 22.7 
Captain 377 310 -67 -17.8 326 369 337 -7 2.1 
Lieutenant  145 -24 -14.2 133 96 79 -73 43.2 
SUBTOTAL 889 637 -252 -28,3 662 
(**) 





20 14 -6 -30.0 - 49 - - - 
 
(*) R. Salas Larrazábal, Historia del Ejército Popular de la República, Madrid, La Esfera de los Libros, 
2006, troops in April 30, 1936. 
(**) Gabriel CARDONA: op. cit., p. 155. 34 Majors, 310 Captains and 102 Lieutenants appear in the 
Military yearbook, but the last number could belong to 1935. 
 
 In the first two-year period the lifting of the integration of the chief inspector 
seemed to affect the readjustment between leaders, but it was on a small scale.
8
 Adjust-
ments in jobs with promotion opportunities, temporary employment and multiple jobs 
and the resulting accrued income were much less marked between officers. For those 
who rendered service since 1934, although the drop in lieutenants was visible, a promo-
tion according to length of service placed them in positions of leadership, consolidating 
the official nature. Lower jobs made up the commands, but recruitment continued to be 
low (table 1). The number of second lieutenants in service, on account of the limited 
recruitment, was lower than the real needs. The Military Medical Corps went from hav-
ing 889 troops in 1931 to 653 in 1936. Finally, the excessive abundance and inefficien-
cy of the army of the Restoration age disappeared.  
 
2. The organization of Military Health Corps in the rebel side. 
 
The uprising was led by the military and it is needless to say that they used their own 
methods. The networks established in the Moroccan campaigns were key. The “African-
ists”, who had gained much power, considered themselves custodians of the “national 
essence”. The rebel leaders had spent part of their career in Africa. General Mola, 
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 The commands of Barcelona and Burgos were removed by decree of 25
th
 May 1931 and those of Madrid 
and Zaragoza, the two insular commands, and the independent commands of Ceuta and Melilla remained. 
The jobs of inspector were suppressed; the position of Medical Health Inspector appeared and was as-
signed to a brigade general. 
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known as “the Director”, was head of the Moroccan forces until March 1936. General 
Cabanellas' military career was forged in Northern Africa. The rebel troops of the Pro-
tectorate wanted only to follow Franco's command. If this concordance has been studied 
in regards to officers on the battlefield,
 9
 it must be said it was equally the case within 
the military medical services. Officers of this Corps were united by the services per-
formed in the African campaigns, to the point where they have been named the “Afri-
canist doctors”. 10 
 When the uprising took place in July 1936, a notable percentage of the Military 
Medical commands remained with the Republic. Calculations are consistent with this 
constant pattern, denied in those studies supported by the victors. Rebel military health 
services faced the challenges of finding the necessary personnel and creating a function-
ing network of care centers. 
 The Navy Medical Corps, composed of 122 medical leaders and 167 members of 
the auxiliary scale, was reduced to 56 leaders and 95 from the auxiliary scale and non-
commissioned officers.
11
 It was not as pronounced in the Military Medical Corps, be-
cause its effects were quickly overcome by the well-equipped central structure of the 
ministry. The effective organisation of the Military Medical Corps in the Spanish Re-
publican Army, which we will not examine here, was shaped on the basis of a correct 
and organised triangulation. The rebel army kept a traditional legal, administrative and 
organic line, but this ordinary route changed with the complete centralisation of deci-
sions. At the start, the organisation of the Military Medical Service was incredibly cha-
otic. The improvisation of all types of clearly erratic measures characterised this first 
phase. One of the first measures adopted, which would powerfully influence the Mili-
tary Medical Corps, was to allow the immediate re-entry of soldiers who had taken ex-
traordinary retirement into the ranks of the rebels. Nevertheless, when we locate the 
inspector generals of the rebel army we see that the majority were lieutenant colonels in 
1936, in other words, limited commanders, and none of them were in the first decision 
line. Colonel José Agustín Martínez Gamboa, who had been in the Inspectorate General 
in Madrid, was also in reserve, but remained officially inactive without any effective 
command in the central organisations. On the contrary, Miguel Parrilla Bahamonde, 
colonel in 1936, chaired the Medical Board of the Military Medical Service for a brief 
period until being posted in the Inspectorate General.  
 The staff of the Military Medical Service was composed of the leaders of the or-
ganic divisions (Table 2). It was under the control of Colonel Melchor Camón Navarra, 
who in July 1936 was in charge of the Zaragoza headquarters. Camón Navarra was in 
the Africa campaigns since 1909, and was returning to the peninsula. Colonel Chamorro 
Lobo was in the same situation, posted in the military hospital of Zaragoza and having 
                                              
9
 Gustau NERÍN: La guerra que vino de África, Barcelona, Crítica, 2005, pp. 128-132, and n. 84, 87. 
10
 Archivo General Militar de Madrid, once Servicio Histórico Militar. Doc. Comandancias militares de 
Ceuta, Tetuán, Larache y la Inspección de Sanidad de Melilla (1915-1926). Academia de Sanidad Militar. 
Alejandro BELÁUSTEGUI: Sanitarios militares en la Guerra de África, 1909-1927, Madrid, Ministerio 
de Defensa, 2011, pp. 51-81. 
11
 Pedro FERRER CÓRDOBA: “La Sanidad en la Marina republicana”, in D. GARCÍA SABELL (ed.), 
Los médicos y la medicina en la Guerra civil española, Madrid, Beecham, 1986; Michael ALPERT: La 
Guerra Civil española en el mar, Madrid, 1987, Chap. 4, IV. 
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served in the Melilla campaign. They were not promoted until the centralisation of 
measures in the headquarters of the generalissimo (Cuartel General del Generalísimo, 
CGG). The presidency of the Medical Board, Inspectorate General of Pharmacy and 
command headquarters came from the organic division of Burgos. Soon a team of lead-
ers from the Canary Islands and from the troops posted in Morocco was added. Personal 
relationships and loyalty were prioritised. Despite the slowness in the appointment of 
Camón Navarra, he was to be a key element. He demanded reports from representatives 
of the Burgos government abroad. He was interested in military medical statistics, 
treatments or pharmaceutical products for diseases, especially contagious diseases.
12
 We 
note the copious reports sent to him from London by the Duke of Alba, secrets that he 
barefacedly obtained from retired commanders of the British army. Of course, they in-
cluded those from Germany, Italy and Portugal. Actually, this Military Medical organi-
sation tried, without saying so, to follow the effectiveness guidelines introduced by the 
Republic. It is false that an attempt was made to return to the situation prior to May 
1931 because, as the commanders knew perfectly well, it was ineffective and even more 
so in campaign. Therefore, direct command of those directing the Medical Groups of 
organic divisions and army forces was maintained. Camón Navarra had to lead the con-
trol —not without clashes and threats– with the Medical Board of the Military Medical 
Service. 
 




Dec. 1937 Dec. 1938 
April 
1939 
Brigadier  2 2 4 
Colonel 6 4 9 21 
Lieutenant-
Colonel 
25 42 51 52 
Major 74 84 116 128 
TOTAL 105 132 178 205 
 
Source: Own calculations from Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España (BOJDNE) 
and Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE), 1936-1939 
 
 The Medical Board of the Military Medical Service was authorised on 27
th
 July 
1937 and maintained its traditional consultative nature. The Inspectorate General con-
tinued to make executive decisions. The Military Medical Service had a main centre, in 
Burgos and Valladolid, and a changing distribution of military hospitals (all of different 
functions and ranks) and direct commands in the different army forces and divisions. A 
delegate for hospital inspections which were coordinated from the CGG was appointed 
for this chaotic administrative structure of the military hospitals, which naturally in-
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 Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (AMAE). Archivo de Burgos. Sanidad, 1043-8-R and 11-
R. Files from November and December 1937. Information from Belgium, Canada, United States, Finland, 
France, Holland, Norway, Switzerland... 
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creased greatly. In October 1936, the responsibility fell to colonel of Army Staff (re-
tired) Jesús Ferrer Gimeno, rebel from day one and exercising as civil governor of Las 
Palmas with an iron fist.  
 Once the medical troops were roughly calculated it became evident to the com-
mand that the needs of the service could not be met with the Military Medical Corps 
contingent that remained. The medical staff in the rebel field did not meet, in the least, 
the most urgent needs. Furthermore, contrasts appeared. In the Northern Army —with 
the strong frame of the 8
th
 organic division of Corunna— the number of staff was higher 
than in the more changing Southern Army. The need demanded taking expeditious 
measures to ease this evident lack of doctors and medical professionals. The solution 
consisted of the integration of civilian doctors, the provisional promotion of students 
from the Military Medical Academy (any level of studies), the forced incorporation of 
permanent and forensic doctors, as well as searching for these in the military units in 
which they were serving as soldiers. The posting of these integrated staff was tagged as 
‘urgent incorporation’.  
 The Junta de Defensa Nacional, the rebel provisory Government from July to 
September 1936, soon announced orders to allow the integration of civilian doctors to 
military levels according to their professional profile. These went from second lieuten-
ant to captain, that is, the traditional scale of non-armed forces. However, at the request 
of the Inspectorate General, the posts of head of the Military Medical Service in main 
divisions and hospitals were reserved for doctors from the Military Medical Corps. In 
this regard the orders were sharp, because they did want to lose control. On 29
th
 August 
1936 rather imprecise rules were given to replace permanent doctors ‘who are perform-
ing duties for the homeland or official commissions’. But this incorporation of rural 
doctors, ill-paid and poorly skilled, did not meet the urgent needs because their absolute 
lack of specialisation hindered their rapid incorporation into surgical teams and, there-
fore, encumbered the scope of the service. ‘The militarisation of doctors and practition-
ers who are at the service of the national cause, and indicating the integrations that 
could be granted to these’, was prepared under decree number 110 of 17th September 
1936. It stated the military ranks: ‘As a result of this militarisation and due to the time it 
lasts, integration corresponding to Captain, Lieutenant and Second Lieutenant can be 
granted to doctors, depending on the category of their professional position…’ This 
chronic lack of medical workers even accelerated the promotions of the integrated 
workers. This integration into higher-ranking jobs —from second lieutenant to lieuten-
ant and from lieutenant to captain— in a short period of time sought to meet the vital 
needs of the military hospital network. Finally, investigating the troops that had already 
been mobilised, the Order of 1
st
 October 1936 stipulated that ‘Doctors, veterinary sur-
geons and practitioners who are soldiers or non-commissioned officers in the army, or 
civilians who are exercising their mission in a military unit, be granted the integration 
indicated under Decree no. 110’. Once again, surgeons —active, with limited and even 
potential duties– were the most sought after in military units. Because, at the start of the 
conflict, the calculation of specialised troops was very inaccurate and the frayed main 
services of the Junta Nacional de Defensa did not require the professional details of 
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anyone. Therefore, health care providers from rebel-controlled towns, as well as those 
who crossed over from the loyalist zone, filled the medical posts. Specialists came from 
this second group, thus exposing the mechanisms of the well-to-do and the fear of vio-
lent factions who operated in the Republican zone. 
 
Table 3. Research on integrated civilian doctors, 1936-1939 (April 1939) 
 
 Number % 
Doctor integrated to captain 262 8.42 
Doctor integrated to lieutenant 1,620 52.04 
Doctor integrated to second lieutenant 1,231 35.54 
TOTAL 3,133 100.00 
 
Source: Own calculations from BODJNE and BOE, 1936-1939 
 
 In the area controlled by the revolt, the incorporation of doctors into the ranks of 
the Movimiento (rebels’ single party) and the military organisations was quick and wide. 
The fact that they had won in conservative areas, where the right had almost permanent-
ly won the elections and where strong-arm tactics still prevailed, increased this support. 
Lack of coordination at times obstructed the incorporation of health professionals. Such 
was the case of Doctor Pedro Laín Entralgo. In August of 1936, he presented himself at 
the Military Government of Pamplona to join the rebels but was turned down and went 
to the Military Hospital, where he was not assigned a post because he was not known 
there. In the end, he joined the Falange.
 13
 The Board of Directors of the Doctors Asso-
ciation of Palencia, chaired by the administrator of the hospital of San Bernabé and sur-
geon Nazario Martín Escobar, immediately changed to the rebels by unanimous vote. 
Martín Escobar was integrated as lieutenant in January 1937. The majority of medical 
associations in the area controlled by the revolt quickly joined the coup. The Doctors 
Association of Zamora, chaired by Dacio Crespo Álvarez, immediately rendered its 
services. Crespo Álvarez was integrated as captain in May 1937. The Doctors Associa-
tion of Soria, chaired by Lárao Garcés Ramos, joined by unanimous vote of 29
th
 Octo-





 The Burgos born surgeon Pedro Avellanosa Campo, later 
chairman of the Doctors Association of the province, was integrated as captain and 
posted in the Muslim hospital (King’s hospital). In a notable but not unanimous propor-
tion, the administrators and heads of service of the provincial hospitals, the provincial 
and municipal charity, public and private clinics, were on the rebel camp from the out-
set. Professors from the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Salamanca served in 
city and military hospitals and in the Spanish Red Cross. Practically all the doctors from 
                                              
13
 Pedro LAÍN ENTRALGO: Descargo de conciencia (1930-1960), Barcelona, Barral, 1976. 
14
 His son, the art critic and writer Juan Antonio Gaya Nuño, who was imprisoned and had to go into exile 
for not supporting the Republic, reviews the life of hierarchical Soria in the novels El Santero de San 
Saturio, (1953) and Los gatos salvajes y otras historias (1968). 
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the provincial hospital of Pamplona and the San Miguel Clinic joined the rebels. The 
doctor from the provincial hospital of Zaragoza, the ear, nose and throat specialist Julio 
Ariño Cenzano, organised this medical unit and was integrated as captain. The case of 
José Abelló Pascual, director of the Anti-Tuberculosis Clinic of Toledo, was unique, in 
so far as, on extended leave of absence since June 1936, he swiftly changed to the rebel 
camp and was integrated as captain. Three Abelló Pascual brothers were actively serv-
ing in the rebel medical services. Even the medical workers employed in private com-
panies joined quickly. This was the case of Vicente de Andrés Bueno, company doctor 
in the North Railways Company (CFE), who was integrated as captain. Those who did 
not join were brutally punished or killed. Felipe Anciones, doctor at the provincial hos-
pital of Zamora, was executed on 14
th
 August 1936 at the walls of the San Atilano cem-
etery. The Valladolid born surgeon Rafael Vega Barrera, administrator of the provincial 
hospital of Lugo, refused to support the uprising and was executed in the old cemetery 




 In August 1936, Manuel Peña Rey, administrator of 
the provincial hospital of Orense (As Logoas hospital) was dismissed and imprisoned in 
Carballino.
16
 The ophthalmologist of the provincial hospital of Pontevedra, Antonio 
Vázquez de Parga Jorge, was detained in 1937 and exiled in the monastery of Oseira.  
  One essential external factor in any analysis of the rebel medical and care units 
is that of the incorporations. These enlistments, which were numerous, took place dur-
ing the majority of the war. Purges and revenge narrowed the enrollments. For example, 
the notable neurosurgeon Manuel Corachan, son of the famous digestive surgeon and 
minister of the Generalitat de Catalunya Manuel Corachan García, was sent by the re-
bels to the front line as a stretcher-bearer where he died from shrapnel wounds in June 
1937. Tragically, a brilliant career was cut short.
 17 
 Nevertheless, the volume of people ‘who moved to the rebels’ was so high that 
soon it was the key piece in the entire military medical system. It is important to note 
that it did not involve training soldier doctors, but making up for the evident lack of 
medics. It did not involve doctors who had trained in the norms of the militia, but rather, 
civilian professionals who were capable of working in this setting and returning quickly 
to their former activity. The incorporations of high level professionals propped up the 
medical effort, even though they did not make up its main volume. Naturally, the most 
important wave was recorded during the first year of war. As well as the measures stipu-
lated in the aforementioned decrees of the National Defence Committee, which affected 
the doctors located in the so-called national zone at the start of the war, there was an 
increasing contingent of doctors who had fled the loyal zone to the Republic via the 
easily penetrable French border. The incorporation took place immediately. Others were 
                                              
15
 A macabre element of the event was that in 1952 he was granted pardon and it was established that he 
had been executed without the mandatory ‘informed’ (La Voz de Galicia, 16th November 2008). 
16
 David SIMÓN LLORDA: Médicos ourensáns represaliados na guerra civil e a posguerra. Historias 
do “longa noite de pedra”, Santiago de Compostela, Fundación Dez de Marzo, 2002. It includes some 
short biographies of surgeons that suffered reprisals and some pieces of information about Provincial 
Hospital. 
17
 Nicholas CONI: Medicine and warfare…, pp. 20 and 174-175. Joan SERRALLONGA: “Sanitat i As-
sistència Social” in Francesc BONAMUSA (dir.), Generalitat de Catalunya. Obra de govern 1931-1939, 
Barcelona, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006, I, pp. 406-423. 
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contacted in Italy, to where they had moved at the start of the war. Doctor Ángel Anto-
nio Ferrer Cagigal, former liberal romanonist deputy and dean of the Faculty of Medi-
cine of Barcelona, moved to the rebels soon after taking refuge in Italy. He was inte-
grated as captain and was appointed member of the the Junta Técnica del Estado, the 
rebel provisory Government from September 1936 to January 1938. Surgical teams and 
their leadership were composed of this integrated staff in a very high rate. The head 
surgeons were renowned civilian surgeons, accorded the military rank of captain. In 
order to maintain an efficient organization, a medical-military congress was held in Lu-
arca, Asturias, in May 1937. Essential matters of planning and war surgery needed to be 
discussed. In February 1939, after the capture of Catalonia, officers of the Galician Ar-
my Corps organized a second medical-military congress near the Levant front, at the 
Teatro Principal in Castellón. Again, health matters were discussed, such as the 




Table 4. Surgical teams and leaders in the military hospitals, 1936-1939 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel 1 
5,7% Major 2 
Captain 2 
Integrated Captain 76 
94,3% 
Integrated Lieutenant 6 
 
It is relatively easy to follow the incorporation of Catalan medical workers into 
the rebel camp: some left the Republican area with passports issued by the Generalitat 
de Catalunya. In particular there was a considerable contingent in the hospitals of Pam-
plona and San Sebastian, as well as in Burgos, Salamanca and Valladolid where they 
were based since the start of the war. Vicente Carulla Riera, a self-confessed conserva-
tive maurist, reshaped and set up the radiology and electrotherapy service of the Mola 
hospital in San Sebastian. Another maurist, collaborator in the dictatorship of Primo de 
Rivera, Lorenzo García-Tornel was integrated as captain and oversaw hospital tasks. 
Agustín García-Diez Andreu, a traditionalist, worked in the military hospitals of Pam-
plona. The surgeon Antonio Matabosch Bassols was on the surgical team of captain 
González del Castillo in the Logroño hospital. The doctor Juan Solsona Cunillera, ad-
ministrator of the civil hospital of Alcazarquivir (where Raimundo Arnet Guasch was 
posted), acted in the battle of Madrid and again in the medical services of the Morocco 
Protectorate. The assistant professor of medical and cardiological disease Luís Trías de 
Bes Giró, another sympathiser of the Regionalist League of Catalonia, joined the San-
tander hospital. The cardiologist and university professor Juan Puig-Sureda Sais moved 
from France to Burgos, being integrated as captain in the Pamplona hospital. The tuber-
culosis specialist and university professor Jacinto Reventós Bordoy was integrated as 
captain and joined the Salamanca military clinic. The doctor from the Barcelona mater-
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nity hospital Santiago Dexeus Font was integrated as second lieutenant for a brief peri-
od. Stopped by the republican authorities, the radiologist Ángel Sanchiz Roqué moved 
to Salamanca as captain. The renowned ophthalmologist Ignacio Barraquer Barraquer 
joined the Southern Army, integrated as medical captain. A unique case, on account of 
the proximity of the area, was that of those who joined the hospital network set up in 
Zaragoza. This is the case of the renowned surgeon Juan Marimon Carbonell, integrated 
as captain in February 1937. Marimon moved to Zaragoza with his disciple Juan Agustí 
Peypoch and members of this team from the Sacred Heart Hospital of Barcelona. Cata-
lan doctors arrived with their teams —sometimes those from before the war– and man-
aged to operate the military hospitals that had been urgently fitted out. 
The incorporation of Basque medical workers, before and after the fall of the 
north front, followed a similar pattern to the Catalan. The Bilbao-born surgeon Eusebio 
García Alonso was integrated as captain in November 1937. Luís Ayestarán Gabarain, 
who founded the renowned radio-surgical institute of Gipuzkoa in 1933, worked for the 
rebels in the hospitals of San Sebastian. Abilio Saldaña was responsible for the coordi-
nation of the Basurto hospital. Carlos Arenal de Simón was in the Los Escolapios hospi-
tal of Bilbao, as were Ramón Azaola Ordanza and José Aguirre Irazagorri. José Eche-
varría Erauzquin was located in the mobile team of the 5
th
 Division, and afterwards in 
the military hospital of San Sebastian. Since 1937 the Gipuzkoa born doctor Manual 
Usandizaga Soraluce, professor in the University of Salamanca, worked in the Valdecil-
la hospital in Santander, where he managed the school of nurses. Miguel Kutz Igarzábal 
was in charge of a ward in the military hospital of Avila. Luís Fernández Villanueva 
was integrated as lieutenant, like the Bilbao born doctor Jesús Soraluce Goñi. The Alava 
born doctor Juan Urquiloa Gastañaga, with a position in the Doctors Association, was 
integrated as lieutenant in January 1937. Jesús Echevarría Urrutia from Donostia imme-
diately joined the column of colonel Solchaga en Gipuzkoa. Alava born Ramiro Gutiér-
rez Celaya, member of the Doctors Association, also became lieutenant in January 
1937. The paediatrician and state childcare specialist Miguel Navas Migueloa, long-
time Falangist, joined the Soria military hospital. The renowned Bilbao born doctor Án-
gel Castresana was in the hospitals of Cantabria and Bilbao. The Mola hospital of San 
Sebastian was administrated by the Military Medical Service commander Leandro Mar-
tín Santos. The surgeon Julián Bergareche Maritorena managed the surgical team of this 
military hospital, with the integrated captains Daniel Errazu Morena, Miguel Vidaur 
Baraibur and lieutenants Enrique Albisua Elcoro and Manual Kutz Echave. 
 As well as the incorporation of doctors, we must consider that of nurses and as-
sistants. Religious congregations, particularly the Hermanas de la Caridad, added super-
visory capacity. Often, the Mother Superior would control the infirmary and handle the 
administration of the military hospitals.
 19
 Doctors would complain that some nuns had 
never before set foot in a hospital. Volunteer nurses were another mayor source of help. 
Mercedes Milá, who had studied at the Rockefeller Foundation, came to Salamanca 
from the loyalist zone. Because of her good contacts with the Franco family, whom she 
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knew from her stay in Ceuta, she was named Inspector General of the Women's Hospi-
tal Services of the CGG on the 24
th
 of March, 1937.
 20
  This organization, with delegates 
in the Army Corps and in the provinces, was totally hierarchical and highly supervised. 
A different case was that of the nursing staff from the Carlist ranks. Since February of 
1936, these women from Navarre had been trained in the clandestine Carlist circles. 
During the war, they amassed tobacco, clothing, food, alcoholic beverages and other 
products and efficiently distributed these donations throughout the hospitals and near 
the front line. This group of nurses, who worked within the Services of Assistance to 
Frontlines and Hospitals, was lead by the nurse from the Rioja María Rosa Urraca Pas-
tor, the “Coronela” (the Colonel) 21. Later, she would be replaced by the wife of General 
Varela. The volunteers of the Sección Femenina (Women's Section) provided their so-
cial services in Frontlines and Hospitals. The Spanish Red Cross, considered an auxilia-
ry of the Military Health Services in wartime, was controlled with an iron hand by the 
Count of Vallellano. It provided health care workers to hospitals and infirmaries. The 
Count of Vallellano's lack of scruples in his treatment of wounded prisoners - “red 
dogs”, in Mola's words – shocked the representative of the International Red Cross 
Committee, Marcel Junod.
 22
 International aid in regards to doctors and nurses was less 
available than on the Republican side, but it soon arrived. One example was the Anglo-
Spanish Medical Service, organized by the Catholic crusade of Gabriel Herbert. The 
Burgos government immediately accorded military rank to these British doctors and 
paid them military salaries.
 23
 
The incorporation of military pharmacists was similar, as we will show. The 123 
pharmacists on the staff of the military pharmacy in July 1936 were divided by half 
when the desertions were counted.
24
 The military pharmacy service in the rebel camp 
was run by the Inspectorate General of Pharmacy, but, unlike what happened in the 
structure of the military medical service, it was not fully organised until the beginning 
of 1938. The Inspectorate General reported directly to the ministry and the CGG. It was, 
therefore, a vertical organisation, especially in the army forces and divisions and with 
the large mobile pharmacy group. From February 1938, the Inspectorate General be-
came the responsibility of the sub inspector Miguel Zavala Lara until his retirement in 
July 1939. The top pharmacist Juan Salvat Bové, who came from the General Command 
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of Canaries after training in the Africa campaign, was secretary. The scarcity of medi-
cines in the military pharmacies was a huge problem at the start of the war. The limited 
individual contributions did not meet the real needs of an oversized army. During the 
war, medicine production centres operated in Valladolid, Seville, Granada, Burgos, Za-
ragoza and Calatayud. In Santiago de Compostela (with a subsidiary unit in Luarca), 
typhoid vaccines was made thanks to some external resources and the peace regning in 
the rearguard. But this production would never have been able to meet the most basic 
needs without a huge contribution from outside.
25
 The purchase of medicines from 
German and Italian industry was enormous. "The former kept themselves more to them-
selves medically, but hhe Italians did collaborate to a considerable extent with the Na-
tionalist military medical services".
26
 The chemical company Compañía Comercial 
Farmacéutica, the Spanish section of IG Farben set up in Seville from September 1936. 
From the capital of Andalusia it sold sulphonamide, saline solutions and analgesic med-
icines exclusively to the army. The Instituto Behring de Terapéutica Experimental 
(Behring Institute of Experimental Therapeutics) set up in the surrounding area, contin-
uing the penetration that began years before. In Portugal and Gibraltar considerable 
amounts of medicines were purchased. The precarious initiative of the pharmaceutical 
laboratories of the Southern Army in Granada and Seville lightly eased the lack of spe-
cific and injectable medicines. As the war continued medical stocks were kept in Ovie-
do, Aviles and San Sebastian.  
 
Table 5. Staff at the service of the military pharmacy when the Civil War came to an end. 
 
  Number % 
Active  725  
 Senior officers and officers 60 8,3 
 Extraordinary retired 8 1,1 
 Mobilised pharmacists 657 90,6 
Auxiliary  2017  
 Pharmacy Warrant Officers  45 2,2 
 Pharmacy practitioners 54 2,7 
 Troops practitioners 1918 95,1 
Voluntary (women)  962  
 
Source: Luis GÓMEZ: op. cit., table 7.6, p. 329. 
 
This military pharmacy service did not work in campaign either –and less so in 
the vanguard, with its mobile units— without the integration of an enormous number of 
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civilian staff. Using the same procedures as in the Military Medical Service, civilian 
pharmacists were integrated from second lieutenant to captain, reserving commands and 
the control of divisions for soldiers. A long process of seeking staff to be integrated was 
carried out among the civilian workers who had not yet been mobilised and among sol-
diers who were serving in the army units. It is important to add a considerable contin-
gent of 962 volunteers who, somewhat improperly, were counted in the service and in 
the relations of the military pharmaceutical group. After the war these staff —integrated 
or voluntary— would return to their professions, although they would keep the preroga-
tives granted and others that they could potentially receive.  
In the loyal zone, the flexibility of the republican institutions to provide medical 
workers to the fighting units and the rearguard was clearly higher during the first 
months of war, both in the ranks of militiamen, and in the commands. The front line 
republican hospitals had an exemplary organisation that would undoubtedly extend to 
the conflict. In studies of the victors of the crusade this flexibility in the supply of medi-
cal staff to republican combat units and, especially, in continuing assistance to the civil-
ian population was avoided. The latter is a particularly interesting point of analysis. The 
incorporation of militarised doctors in the republican zone to meet the needs of the civil-
ian population, even in moments of clear danger, continued. In the rebel camp, with 
municipal, provincial and regional powers having been wiped out, the situation trusted 
almost exclusively in centralised organisations that did not demonstrate effective prepa-
ration in the delicate field of civil assistance. That is, doctors were almost all moved to 
military needs. Following the erratic provisions of the CGG it can be stated that there 
was practically no effective civil assistance in the rebel camp. Decrees to integrate civil-
ian staff were imperative in a situation that failed to satisfy the most common needs. 
The areas providing care services for the civilian population remained almost empty, 
and civilians had enormous delays receiving help when they needed it the most. On an-
other note, prisoner camps and workers’ battalions were looked after in a markedly in-
different manner. It would not be until the end of the war when medical positions in the 
disciplinary camps and battalions, full of prisoners, would acquire some weight in the 
erratic organisational structure of the posting of integrated doctors.  
 
3. The operative deployment of rebel hospitals network. 
 
The challenge of creating hospital teams that respected the standards of efficiency of an 
army at war was hardly met. Few of the recommendations from modern military manu-
als were put into practice. The restoration of the military hierarchy did not represent a 
stimulus. On the contrary, it slowed down development. Contrary to what the victors 
claimed, observers first, and analysts later, clearly saw the prevailing disorganization – 
a lack of organization which, for example, prevented the control of a plague at a camp. 
Instead of coordinating with the civilian services, military health care on the Nationalist 
side simply stripped them of personnel, leaving large segments of the population with-
out routine services and increasing morbidity in the deprived areas. The strict adherence 
to chaotic miscalculations regarding medical supplies, evacuations, hospitalizations and 
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surgical equipment, undisclosed for decades, astounds us.
 27
 Mistakes were made even 
in the critical health services provided at the rearguard of the Northern Army.
 28
 
 Despite such errors, emergency procedures and battlefield surgery gave rise to 
advances and even discoveries,
 29
 although they cannot be compared to breakthroughs 
on the Republican side, which was more open and adaptable in its approach.
 30
 These 
scientific achievements, divulged under difficult conditions, were put to use in World 
War II. Dr. Trueta could "build on earlier work by Winett Orr, Bastos Ansart, and oth-
ers, and perfect the enclosed technique for the management of compound fractures".
31
 
Among them were new methods of blood transfusion, which were later published, that 
had been put into practice by both sides under difficult conditions.
 32
 
The rebel army nourished a closely-woven network of hospitals, but it had serious 
problems. It is clear that this medical mesh was crucial to supporting the efforts of the 
war. And although this relation is very clear, very little research has established it. For 
our part, we state that there was some improvisation in this military hospital structure, 
as occurred in the organisation of the Military Medical Service, the military pharmacy 
and in the confused incorporation of its staff. It involved a premise of effectiveness that 
the victors simply established and that was not authorised; rather, the opposite occurred. 
Since the beginning of the war hospitalisation had the following main centres: Zarago-
za, Valladolid, Burgos, Pamplona and Seville. Some hospitals appeared as reference 
elements, seeking a structure that was not always real. The name group of hospitals or 
military hospitals sought a hierarchical organisational structure that was rarely effective.  
 The military hospital of Valladolid was the most important in the conflict, but 
not the only one.
33
 The abundance of staff serving in this city and the rank of the com-
manding officers demonstrate this statement. In Medina del Campo another hospital 
was built, with 200 beds, and medical staff from the Red Cross were hired. However, 
‘the administrator of the hospital (will be) the person to bear the hierarchical representa-
tion of the army’. It is important to add the conglomeration of hospitals set up in the 8 th 
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military district (Corunna) and the valued role of the hospital beds in the Military Medi-
cal Service of the navy. A separate issue was the maintenance of care activities in the 
African posts, although it was not substantial in the development of operations after 
November 1936, due to the lack of staff and the evolution of the war. Actually, a con-
siderable part of the medical staff from the protectorate served in peninsular units. The 
same occurred with the military medical command of the Canary Islands, directed since 
1938 by lieutenant colonel Babil Coiduras Maza, previously posted in the Carabanchel 
hospital. The command of the Balearic Islands was a different issue, due to the intensity 
of the (air) combats, the huge number of Italian staff in the city and the urgent strategic 
needs. Despite this, the military hospital of Palma de Mallorca operated without effec-
tive regulation and with integrated doctors until the beginning of 1939, when lieutenant 
colonel Ramón Anglada Foxá took charge of the leadership of the Military Medical 
Service. As a last note we mention that soon military hospitals and civil areas for army 
use were organised for Muslim officers and soldiers. They were centres –the number of 
sixteen was reached- with their own distinctive characteristics that were inspected by 
religious authorities who had come from Morocco and the African posts.  
The aviation army was a different issue. As a standard rule it did not operate inde-
pendently of the command of the regular army and its troops were distributed in differ-
ent locations. When the uprising took place, only the airfields of Seville, Leon, Logroño 
and those located on the African coasts remained in the hands of the rebels; additional-
ly, without some of the staff from the ordinary service. Commanding officer Mariano 
Puig Quero, the real driving force behind the service, was inactive as regards the rebel 
camp and did not join until 1939. Puig Quero, who was head of the medical service in 
the air force in Cuatro Vientos, had revealed the formation of this service in a speech 
read at the II International Medical Aviation Congress, held in Madrid in 1933. The air 
medical services, despite an attempt at organisation, did not have the continuity to be 
completely effective. Commanding officer Federico Jiménez Ontiveros, who in 1936 
was still captain, was in charge of managing it. Lieutenant colonel Miguel Lafont Lopi-
dana remained in medical command, while the aviation general hospital had a captain. 
Therefore, without the integrated doctors, the role of this service would have been even 
more reduced.  
 The territory occupied by the rebels in the first months of the civil conflict had 
room for a large hospital park, although the number of beds and the staff working there 
were of different statuses. We show how imprecise —and even incorrect— the names of 
these hospital centres were. Because, the uncertain name military hospital encompasses 
very different situations. A large number were merely front hospitals, transit hospitals 
or evacuation hospitals or clinics that had been set up very quickly. The hospitals of the 
divisions were markedly provisional, because they were set up and taken down very 
quickly. The “hospitales de sangre”, or front line hospitals, were set up near the front 
line but at a distance of about five kilometers to protect then from enemy fire. They 
consisted of a medical and, most importantly, a surgical unit. Others were even small 
temporary set-ups in times of great difficulty.
34
 That was the case of surgical teams 
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‘with annexed hospital’ set up in Favara de Matarranya and Santa Bárbara (near Tor-
tosa) or the emergency station in Gandesa during the battle of the Ebro. Two surgical 
teams and an infirmary that could hold 785 patients between Temp, la Pobla de Segur 
and Sort were set up for the Navarra army force. Patients were evacuated to rearguard 
hospitals via a transitional hospital.We have added a note about the different types of 
difficulties encountered by the trains that acted as hospitals, especially in the Northern 
Army.
35
 It is shocking to compare them to the autochirs or autochirds
36
 of the loyal 
camp, because they were used in particular to evacuate the wounded and not to operate 
on them. On another note the Condor Legion obtained extensive use of the trains, 
around thirty beds per carriage. The rebels could not afford any problems with the Ger-
mans, because Hitler considered the Spanish Front to be of secondary importance in any 
war plans. 
 The structure of the network of military hospitals in the rebel camp had three 
clearly marked territorial centres: Seville, the Burgos-Valladolid-Salamanca conglomer-
ation, Pamplona and the Zaragoza area, which corresponded to the enclaves where the 
uprising succeeded. It is important to mention that the progressive occupation of the 
territory involved new necessities and the adaptation of the resources that were found 
and that often changed functions. In the column that moved from Seville to Badajoz and 
Caceres a very precarious medical service was set up, with a reduced number of centres 
such as the front hospital of Villafranca de Barros and that of the spa station of Baños 
de Montemayor, until reaching other more compact hospital enclaves. Lieutenant colo-
nel Servando Camúñez del Puerto quickly prepared the Badajoz hospital once the opera-
tions of II platoon of Tetuán and the V Legion Bandera were complete. In Caceres, the 
legion hospital was located in the premises of the teachers’ college and had a strong 
security set-up to avoid escapes, outrages and leaving without permission. During the 
course of the war the network of hospitals covered the conquered territory, but did not 
always follow the most conventional or the most convenient steps. 
In the Southern Army the establishment of assistance centres in the city of Seville, 
using all the available means, facilitated the coordination —initially with great difficul-
ties— of the deployment of medical centres in the territory of the 2nd division and in the 
advance towards the west and the centre. All the establishments of the city were in the 
hands of the command of the Military Medical Service, without serious difficulties. 
Thus, the majority of the prestigious doctors who after the civil war joined the Anda-
lusian Society of Traumatology and Orthopaedics served on the camp of the rebels from 
the beginning. The Carlist infantry regiments of Seville maintained their own medical 
structure for some time, although it was not always well coordinated. The small centres 
of the Spanish possessions in Morocco and the relevant conglomerate of the Canary 
Islands command stayed behind in the rearguard. The group of hospitals of Seville was 
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composed of six military hospitals and militarised civil hospitals, as well as some addi-
tional ones with diverse capacities in Marchena, Osuna and Arahal. The rank of officers, 
managed by the lieutenant colonels Antonio Moreno Palacios, Jesús Bravo-Ferrer Fer-
nández and Eduardo Talegón Arcas, made it clear that a coordinator element was need-
ed; a coordination that would not always be effective. In addition to the Seville hospi-
tals, in the territory of the military area of the 2
nd
 military district almost thirty military 
hospitals had been distributed with great precision and were operating with greater or 
lesser intensity. The aim was to first deal with the advance of the columns. 
The Muslim hospital of Sanlúcar de Barrameda, opened on 5
th
 March 1937 and 
run by commanding officer Huertas, had a capacity of more than 200 beds and in April 
was visited by the naib of the Gran Vizier from the eastern area of the Rif. But, un-
doubtedly, the main hospitalisation centre for Muslim officers and soldiers in the whole 
rebel zone was that of Granada, served from the start of the conflict by professors from 
that university, by a notable contingent and, as in the majority, with large security and 
custody systems to avoid all types of escapes and outrages. In this hospital for Muslims 
there was ‘a mosque, rooms for the Faquih, an ablution room, a Muslim coffee bar, an 
abattoir and a kitchen for Muslims, with a capacity of 300 people’. The urologist and 
surgeon Rafael Alcalá-Santaella Núñez, integrated medical captain from Valencia, and 
at the time professor of the University of Valencia, coordinated the Muslim hospital of 
Granada. Luis Rojas Ballesteros, who after the war would become a professor of psy-
chiatry in Granada, served in this centre. The hospitals of the Southern Army were enti-
ties of unequal capacity and resources; they did not always meet the needs of the ser-
vice, but sought to provide beds that were operational and did not require alterations or 
adaptations. Furthermore, emergency centres were set up in premises handed over or 
occupied, not always with appropriate staff. This is the case of the emergency hospitals 
of the San Pelagio seminary in Cordoba, of the small hospital in Palma del Río, of the 
mobile hospital in Los Escolapios in Seville
37
 and the Mora hospital in Cadiz. This con-
glomerate included the main military hospital in Seville, that of Granada and the unsta-
ble one in Cordoba, and others of limited capacity such as the front hospital of Lan-
jarón, that of Antequera, the small Jesús Nazareno hospital in Cordoba and that set up in 
the Refuge of Granada.  
In the Northern Army, since the beginning of the war there was a wide network of 
hospitals, which after some time were effectively coordinated and had resources. With-
out a doubt, that of Valladolid had the most resources, volume and coordination. The 
fact that the doctors from this zone of action moved swiftly to the rebel army facilitated 
the supply of staff to hospitals in the district. The main centres of the Burgos-Valladolid 
area were the groups of hospitals of Salamanca, Pamplona, Soria, Zamora, Palencia and 
Logroño, to which those of Santander, San Sebastian and the conglomerate of Bilbao 
(with Algorta and Basurto) were soon added. From these main military hospitals, the 
colonels Joaquín Arechaga Casanova and Luis Rubio Janini coordinated, with serious 
problems, the medical service of the two military districts. An enormous network of 
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front hospitals with small capacities was set up and the provincial hospitals were coor-
dinated with military units. In the Pamplona hospital the doctor Pascual Ipiens Lacasa 
managed the surgical team. In Valladolid a hospital devoted to Italians from the CTV 
operated with scarce material and roaming medical staff.
38
 In the city of Burgos, the 
main Muslim hospital —the King’s Hospital— was managed by the commanding of-
ficer Ángel Martín Monzón. Although the capacity of this centre cannot be compared 
with that of Granada, its crew for these troops was the largest of the Northern Army.
39
 
The hospital of Salamanca was set up as a Muslim hospital, while the regular hospital 
was set up in La Vega. Some Muslims could be looked after in the Alfonso Carlos hos-
pital of Pamplona. This hospital was the largest of the zone with up to 1,345 beds. It 
was created in the seminary of Pamplona in October 1936 by the Carlist Junta Central 
de Guerra of Navarra and operated until May 1939. It had a notable and compact per-
formance during the entire war with more than 32,700 attendances. The eighteen hospi-
tals of Navarre played a key role in the evacuation of wounded troops following the 
Teruel offensive in the winter of 1937-1938. The Battle of Teruel was fought under ex-
treme weather conditions and produced terrible cases of frostbite and frozen limbs 
which were treated with an unusual surgical technique dubbed “pie de Teruel” (Teruel 
feet). 
40
 For a limited period, a legion hospital was set up in Logroño, as added broad 
and essential police custody, managed from the beginning of 1938 by the medical cap-
tain Francisco Mallol de la Riva.  
The hospital system of the 8
th
 military district (table 6), with headquarters in Co-
runna, was one of the best equipped. Although the number of beds was not excessive, 
the speed of the construction gave it a unique importance. The leadership of the services 
of this military district fell to lieutenant colonel Julián Rodríguez López who at the 
same time managed the military hospital of San Cayetano in Santiago de Compostela. 
The centralised hospital care fell to the main military hospital of Corunna, managed by 
lieutenant colonel Juan Barcia Eliacegui. The staff of this hospital differed from the 
others in the number of troops and the Military Medical Service’s own staff. The aston-
ishing abundance of small hospitals and infirmaries called for management by medium 
ranks from the Military Medical Service and a large number of integrated doctors, who 
joined the Movimiento at the beginning. In the cities of Vigo and Leon Muslim hospitals 
operated with security and custody since 1937, such as the Muslim hospital of Bella 
Vista. An under-equipped Muslim hospital in the Guitiriz spa was closed on 31
st
 Octo-
ber 1937. This centre accommodated 400 patients in crammed rooms. Protests about the 
bad conditions of the premises resulted in the patients being transferred to the military 
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hospital of Vigo. In Mansilla Mayor, in the village of Nogales in Leon, the hospital of 





Table 6. Military hospitals in the 8
th
 military district, by provinces. 
 
Corunna 11  
Orense 2  
Pontevedra 7 (Vigo muslim hospital, Bellavista muslim hospital) 
Lugo 3 (Guitiriz muslim hospital) 
Oviedo 5  
Leon 6 (Leon muslim hospital; Condor Legion hospital) 
  
Source: Own calculations from BODJNE and BOE, 1936-1939 
 
 In the 5
th
 military district, Zaragoza, a dense hospital structure was set up. Ini-
tially, the wounded were transferred to hospitals in the city of Zaragoza, where there 
were seventeen operating. The military hospital was the best equipped, with an extraor-
dinary team of doctors from the outset. By appointing the heads of the Military Medical 
Service from among the military doctors who were serving in Zaragoza, General 
Cabanellas laid the foundations of the first organisation of the services, a structure 
which in October and November 1936 would be reshaped by the CGG. The head of the 
Military Medical Service continued to be lieutenant colonel Fernando Marzo Abecia. In 
the province of Zaragoza there were the hospitals of Daroca, Alhama de Aragón, Calpe, 
Monzón, Terminillo, the Torres de Calatayud polytechnical hospital and the military 
hospitals of Calatayud and Jaraba,
42
 although there were some operational problems. 
The beds available varied and were scarce in the front hospital of Daroca and more nu-
merous in the military hospital of Alhama de Aragón, managed by the commanding 
officer José Blanco Rodríguez, who adapted it at the end of 1937. The military hospital 
of Teruel was very run down, but those of Alcañiz, Albarracín were still operating, as 
well as the small hospital in Caminreal, that of Cella
43
 near Villarquemado and that of 
Monreal del Campo. At the beginning of 1937 a Muslim hospital was built as a section 
in itself in the hospital of Zaragoza. Soon essential services —although nothing com-
pared to Granada or Burgos— were added, as well as security and custody.  
One of the most awkward problems faced by the Military Medical Service in both 
sides was the huge number of cases of venereal diseases that required urgent control and 
specific treatment. Although the rebel authorities spoke openly about prostitution and its 
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sanitary effects, they always denied the problem, and consequently there is a complete 
lack of statistics. "This is no accident. In the Avila military archive, documents pertain-
ing to self-harm were removed from their original folders during Franco's dictator-
ship".
44
 The reason was obvious: in what was known as national Spain, the victorious 
crusaders could not spread or catch such a terrible plague. Measures were taken, but not 
swiftly enough. The result of this situation was practically identical on both sides. Pros-
titution, even the importing of women from North Africa, was tolerated on the rebel 
side on the basis of outdated inspection standards and with disregard to any moral con-
siderations. The light control applied to prostitutes was not sufficient to effectively fight 
against venereal diseases. The dermatologist Enrique Álvarez Sáinz de Aja, a conserva-
tive doctor integrated as medical captain since April 1937, was appointed director of the 
anti-venereal preventative service of the army. The network of small clinics took some 
time to become effective and was linked to different army forces, which continued to 
prioritise (when they did) the medical control of prostitutes, but without any means. 
These services, prepared for the entire army, but especially in the north and the centre, 
were set up in Valladolid.  
The new service had renowned doctors such as Jaime Payrí Dalmau, son of the 
famous dermatology professor from the University of Barcelona, and Rafael Albiol Hi-
guer, who served as soldiers in the 2
nd
 command of Military Medical Services in Val-
ladolid. Both swiftly moved to the preventative services of the Northern Army, integrat-
ed as medical lieutenants. In 1938 the doctor Peyrí Dalmau served in the Navalcarnero 
centre. Some second lieutenant doctors such as Emilio Cabanellas de Torres, Santiago 
Ortiz García and Máximo Muños Casas joined this service in the city of Valladolid, and 
were promoted to lieutenant in May 1937. Others, who had already moved to reserves, 
were reincorporated into active service. This is the case, in August 1937, of the doctor 
of the official anti-venereal disease service Félix Contreras Dueñas. The same occurred 
with the urgent incorporation of doctors, clinics and even bacteriologists from the offi-
cial anti-venereal disease service to this Military Medical Service, all of whom were 
from the scale of the Home Office and integrated as medical lieutenant. During all the 
war, there were private doctors who treated venereal disease by paying. Other cases 
were taken to the urology services, spread out across the hospital network. Later, seri-
ous cases were treated in the military hospital of Getafe, but no reliable statistics were 
gathered. 
45
 Despite appearing in the medical organisational structure, this service con-
tinued to be subjected to all types of shortages, worsened by the lack of specific medica-
tion.  
 
4. At the end of the War: the useful placement. 
 
After the war, the incorporated civilian doctors, led again by the old controlling medical 
elite, collected favors for their participation in the form of jobs and even bounty. We are 
talking about the useful placement in the institutions of post-war society up to 1944, 
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when the law setting the main guidelines for national health was passed.  46 We discover 
them at different levels in three fields of activity: the elite medical workers, the politics 
of the regime and, no less importantly, as permanent doctors. That is, in the post-war 
period, the integrated doctors were soon discharged from the over-sized army and re-
turned to the civil health system: state and provincial institutions, professional associa-
tions, boards, foundations, private organizations, scientific academies, as well as a ra-
ther considerable proportion that entered university lecturing. In this way, the elite of 
professionals that had always controlled the public care structure remained cleverly un-
altered. Some names were different, but the essence remained the same. It was a very 
small group that anchored its strong roots in the Administration and extended its tenta-
cles throughout the entire geography of Spain.  
  The integrated civilian doctors occasionally postponed their active connection 
with the army, although they maintained the job or similar for ‘other purposes’. The 
firm experience of having participated in the victorious camp enabled them to obtain 
more or less important positions in civil health organisations that were dependent on the 
state, councils, civil governments, towns and other institutions. The same can be seen in 
the universities and research centres (CSIC). In the latter, for example, the Cajal school 
was completely purged.
47
 With this firm attachment to health and education institutions 
these court managers definitively moved to the previous posts and to pre-war schools. 
Thus, supporters of the regime methodically set up there. All the staff of the universities 
were purged and the deans (some of whom were integrated captains) undertook and 
sometimes decided the cases. The most well-known case is that of the dean of the Fac-
ulty of Medicine of the University of Madrid, Fernando Enríquez de Salamanca y Dan-
vila, and the systematic purging of former colleagues and adversaries. It was with this 
same fury that Enrique Suñer Ordóñez purged the doctors committed to the work of the 
Republic.  
 In the so-called political organisations of the Franco regime, there was also a re-
vealing number of integrated doctors. With the usual ostentation of the rank obtained in 
the army, many followed a career in the vertical structure. At the beginning, the most 
popular paths in this useful placement were the councils and city halls. Like beforehand 
in the poor provincial and municipal charity, the new administrators took important po-
sitions in the hospital centres that depended on these public organisations. Within the 
national area the court managers were posted in the National Health Board, controlled 
with an iron fist by colonel José Alberto Palanca from the Directorate-General for 
Health. In the hospital wards, the top positions were largely entrusted to those who had 
actively participated in the war. Authorities with decision-making powers within the 
Francoist medical apparatus would receive adulation and would lord it over profession-
als whose only aim had been to survive. It was total subordination and unshakable ad-
herence. Francoism opened the doors to a replay of a thick web of interests. The tradi-
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tional controllers of Spain's health care ensconced themselves in academic institutions,
 
48
 official associations and professional organizations where they exerted great influence 
and created unshakable bonds. A new “counter-reformation” was put into practice based 
on flattery towards the supporters and ruthless attacks against the vanquished. This en-
vironment created a smoke screen that, for years, concealed earlier behaviors that would 
now be considered contrary to a reasonable community spirit, to respectable medical 
practice or the management of a health service. 
 At the ground level the placement as permanent doctors of those who had served 
as integrated officers during the war and did not have prominence can be appreciated. A 
notable number occupied positions in public homecare assistance on the scale according 
to merits obtained, leaving those who chose these jobs in open examinations in second 
place. This unique influx of fervent doctors contributed towards ensuring complete con-
trol of the defenceless civilian population. As we can observe in the table, the placement 
of these ex-combatants in the position of permanent doctor fulfilled a clever policy un-
dertaken by the Franco authorities to benefit those who collaborated in the war —both 
in the army and the navy— and at the same time control any possible attempts at pro-
test. Therefore, those associations of permanent doctors who in the past had battled to 
obtain better and more decent conditions in the professional army disappeared or were 
left without relevant functions.  
 
Table 7. Public homecare assistance doctors who took up their positions in 1940. 
 
GROUP Number % 
Maimed 22 1.6 
Ex-combatant, officers 465 34.3 
Other ex-combatants 185 13.6 
Ex-prisoners 76 5.6 
Orphans and victim kins 39 2.9 
SUBTOTAL 787 58.0 
Other 569 42.0 
TOTAL 1356 100.0 
 
Source: Home Office, order of November 30, 1940 (Boletín Oficial del Estado, December 14) 
  
 “Will it be necessary to remind Spaniards of the severe chastisement wreaked by 
such a carefree and miserly life?” Falangist doctor Laín Entralgo's cruel question 
preached total submission to the new figures of authority.
 49
 Without a doubt, this as-
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sessment by the “well-placed” professor of medical history was subscribed to uncondi-
tionally within the privileged quarters of civilian medicine.  
 These loyal medical workers, trained in the columns of the victors of the war 
(table 7), would be the first to applaud and spread the confusing and rather ineffective 
‘social’ measures of the Franco regime as regards public care.50 From their positions of 
responsibility, the adherents buttressed the regime. The director-general of Public 
Health who drafted the 1944 Health Law was Colonel Juan Alberto Palanca, who had 
been an army physician on the Northern Front. The head of state pediatrics, Juan Bosch 
Marín, explained without blushing that there were no poor people and that wretchedness 
existed only on the outskirts of Madrid and Barcelona. In 1942, he stated that the “aver-
age standard of living in Spain is sufficient, within the usual level of sobriety”. 51 
Without a doubt, a large degree of the widespread legend of the care policy of the 
Franco regime stems from this group, who unfortunately have been undervalued in 
many studies, and not only from those who remained in more responsible positions. In 
this way, the integration into military ranks came to an end with the assault on public 
jobs and other privileges in a deferred and permanent payment to loyalty. Within the 
Francoist Army, the Military Health Corps remained encumbered by its old problems. 
The health services again became ensconced in the most tremendous ineffectiveness, 
without any attempt at improvements. In 1939, after the war, health and hygiene within 




The reforms undertaken by the Republic had resulted in a better sized, better organized 
army with a credible budget. With the 1936 uprising, the physicians of the Military 
Health Corps were split in two. For the most part, senior medical commanders remained 
in areas loyal to the Republic. In any case, in July 1936 neither side had a military 
health structure strong enough to meet the urgent demands of prolonged warfare. 
 On the rebel side, command of the Military Health Services corresponded first to 
the Jefatura de Zaragoza, headquarters of the presidency of the National Defense Junta. 
But when General Franco became head of state, it was centralized in the CGG. At first, 
the commanders were from the mainland, but they were soon joined by arrivals from the 
Canary Islands and the African posts. The “Africanist doctors” held enormous power 
during the war and in its aftermath. Franco and his circle prioritized personal relations 
and unquestioning loyalty. 
 Military staff were insufficient to cover needs and it was necessary to incorpo-
rate civilian health care workers, who were granted military rank according to their pro-
fessional categories. The number of incorporations was huge, particularly of surgeons. 
Barely one out of ten heads of surgical teams was military. Some of these civilian doc-
tors came from among the conscripts, other had fled, others had crossed over to the re-
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bels' side. Many doctors from the occupied zone signed up: some out of conviction, 
others out of fear. But sometimes, the pay and the bounty were sufficient incentives. 
Health workers who failed to enroll were violently repressed. The medical cliques re-
tained their power in this situation. Contrary to what has been said, many Catalan and 
Basque health workers were among those who crossed over to the Francoist ranks. As-
sistant staff at the military hospitals were controlled by religious congregations. Volun-
teer nurses from Frontlines and Hospitals added to the pool of assistants. There was 
some international aid, but much less than on the Loyalist side. 
 The web of military hospitals was operative, but disorganized. The network was 
centered around Zaragoza, Valladolid, Burgos, Pamplona and Sevilla. The Galician 
zone was an area of great rearguard hospital activity. Medical evacuations from the 
front line hospitals to rearguard hospitals were improved by the use of hospital trains. 
All facilities in the occupied zone, be they public or private, were put to use. Foreign 
fighters had their own medical teams, hospitals and means of transport, as did the Mo-
roccan troops and the legionnaires. But although reports by the victors denied it, chaos 
reigned. 
 The supply of medicines by German and Italian laboratories was fundamental, as 
were purchases made abroad. Spanish drug manufacture did not cover basic needs. 
These drugs played an important role in the treatment of venereal diseases, which repre-
sented a mayor health problem. The tacit tolerance, even encouragement, of prostitution 
was long-lasting. Its cover-up, and the cover-up of its health consequences, has posed a 
problem for investigators. War medicine and surgery gave rise to important advances 
which would be further developed during World War II. The publication of results al-
lows us to assert that advances were made on both bands, but many more on the Repub-
lican side. 
 After the war, civilian health workers left the Army. Doctors, pharmacists and 
assistants claimed their rewards in the forms of public sector jobs, favors or postings, 
even war bounty. The traditional medical elites, who had presided over much of the 
military health services during the war, returned to power in civilian society. This small 
group took charge of the Francoist medical administration and its institutions. But the 
regime's propagandists were to be found among the rank and file of the medical com-
munity. These “faithful servants of the State” occupied public health posts and applaud-
ed the social measures of the Franco regime. But the New State did close to nothing for 
military medicine, which remained in a precarious state. 
